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COVENANTS OF HABITABILITY IN SHORT TERM LEASES
Covenants of habitability are not new to leases of short
duration, but their acceptance has not yet been universally
recognized. The author suggests that such covenants are both
desirable and necessary.
I. INTRODUCTION
At common law there was no implied covenant that leased premises
would be habitable upon the commencement of the tenancy.'
However, some courts recognized the exception that a furnished
dwelling leased for a short term was presumed to be habitable for the
purpose of immediate occupancy.2 More recently, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that a covenant of
habitability will be implied in law in leases of residential dwellings;3 the
conditions to which the covenant relates are to be found in the Housing
Regulations of the District of Columbia.
Maryland follows the doctrine that there is no implied warranty that
a leased dwelling house shall be fit for habitation.4 With the exception
of local public legislation,' such is the present state of the law. This
comment will review the inadequacies of this legal posture in regard to
leases of less than a year's duration.
II. THE DOCTRINE CAVEAT EMPTOR IN AN URBAN
SOCIETY
Whereas the doctrine of caveat emptor was arguably suited for an
agrarian society, its continued utilization in an urban setting cannot be
1. E.g., State ex rel. Bohom v. Feldstein, 207 Md. 20, 113 A.2d 100 (1955).
2. Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892); Smith v. Marrable, 11 M. & W. 5,
152 Eng. Rep. 693 (1834); Young v. Povich, 121 Me. 141, 116 A. 26 (1922).
3. Javins v. First Nat'l. Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (1970).
4. State ex rel. Pumphrey v. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., 176 F.2d 414, 417 (4th Cir.
1949), held the landlord liable to the tenant for injury arising out of uninhabitable premises
when the portion of the premises wherein the tenant sustained injury is under the control
of the landlord; however, absent such control, the landlord is not liable for injury sustained
by the tenant.
5. E.g., Baltimore City residents may invoke breach of an implied warranty of habitability.
(a) In any written or oral lease or agreement for rental of a dwelling intended for
human habitation, the landlord shall be deemed to covenant and warrant that the
dwelling is fit for human habitation. If the dwelling is not fit for human habitation,
the tenant.., is entitled to the following remedies ....
(1) An action ... for breach of contract or warranty which may include a prayer
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justified. As early as 1892, the Massachusetts court in Ingalls v. Hobbs6
held that a lease of a completely furnished dwelling house for a single
season at a summer watering place contained an implied warranty that
the house was fit for habitation. The test applied was that one hiring
such furnished dwelling should not be expected to make other than
reasonable preparation in appropriating the dwelling to the use for
which it was.designed. 7
While a few courts exercised a cautious willingness to overlook the
common law doctrine that leases contained no implied covenant of
habitability, the evolving exception regarding furnished dwellings leased
for a short term was strictly construed, being limited to "temporary"
rentals,8 defects existing at time of rental,9 and defects in furnishing.' 0
It was implicit in these decisions that the lessee was bargaining for the
opportunity to enjoy the premises as a temporary dwelling and that the
continued application of the doctrine caveat emptor was not designed
to satisfy that end. The Ingalls court reasoned that the lessee bargained
not only for the opportunity to enjoy the premises, but also for the
opportunity to enjoy them without either the delay or the expense of
preparing the dwelling for use.' 1 Accordingly, the doctrine of caveat
emptor (the essence of which placed the burden of uninhabitable
premises on the lessee) would often work an unnecessary injustice on
the lessee.' 2
In Lemle v. Breeden, ' 3 the plaintiff leased a furnished home in the
Diamond Head area of Honolulu and, upon occupancy, discovered it to
be infested with rats. He immediately notified the landlord's agent of
his intention to vacate and demanded a return of his deposit. The court
recognized an implied warranty that a leased dwelling must be habitable
and fit for the use intended.' 4 It further indicated that "common law
conceptions of a lease and the tenant's liability for rent are no longer
viable,"' ' in that many lessees in today's urban society no longer reap
the rent from the land, their interest being the leasing of premises solely
for residential purposes. An additional reason for recognition of the
warranty is that it is the lessee's obvious purpose to obtain immediate
possession of premises that are in a suitable condition.' 6 Further, in
for recision [sic] of the contract:
(2) Recision [sic ] of the contract including the return of all deposits and money
towards rent paid during the period of the breach of the warranty of habitabil-
ity ....
Law of May 17, 1972, Ch. 481, § 9-14.1(a), [1971] Laws of Md. 1053.
6. 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892).
7. Id. at 351, 31 N.E. at 287.
8. See Murray v. Albertson, 50 N.J.L. 167, 13 A. 394 (Ct. Err. & App. 1888).
9. See Davenport v. Squibb, 320 Mass. 629, 632-33, 70 N.E.2d 793, 795 (1947).
10. See Murray v. Albertson, 50 N.J.L. 167, 13 A. 394 (1888).
11. 156 Mass. 348, 350, 31 N.E. 286 (1892).
12. Id.
13. 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
14. Id. at 433, 462 P.2d at 474.
15. Id. at 430, 462 P.2d at 473.
16. Id.
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Lund v. MacArthur,' 7 the covenant of habitability was extended to
include unfurnished as well as furnished dwellings; however, the court
stated that the defect must be material in order to constitute a breach
of the implied covenant of habitability.' 8
In Marini v. Ireland,' 9 the plaintiff-tenant was permitted to deduct
the cost of repairs of a toilet on the premise that the purpose of the
lease was to supply the tenant with suitable living quarters. The court
recognized that the letting of residential dwellings demands that the
premises be safe from latent defects, and that the covenant of
habitability therefore guarantees that facilities vital to the use thereof
will be free from "faulty original construction or deterioration" from
and after the commencement of the tenancy.2 o
III. THE DOCTRINE OF CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION
In the absence of an implied covenant of habitability, the tenant is
confronted with two courses of action: either he remains under the
terms of the lease or he vacates. However, if the tenant chooses the
latter, he is compelled to comply with the requirements of the doctrine
of constructive eviction. The doctrine of constructive eviction requires
that the tenant vacate within a reasonable time after giving notice that
the premises are uninhabitable or unfit for the tenant's purpose.2 ' If
the tenant fails to vacate within a reasonable time, he waives his right to
terminate the lease, such right being based on the landlord's breach of
the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. 2 2
In effect, the doctrine is no more than a legal fiction analogous to
the breach of a material covenant in a bilateral contract.2 3 In order to
terminate the lease upon abandonment, the tenant carries with him the
burden of establishing facts sufficient to constitute constructive
eviction;2 4 but if the lessee wishes to remain, he has no remedies when,
in fact, he should be afforded the opportunity (at the landlord's
expense) to remedy those defects which have rendered the premises
uninhabitable.2" This can be accomplished by allowing the tenant to
deduct from his rent the reasonable cost of repairs made which are
necessary to restore the premises to a habitable condition.2 6
Where housing has been scarce, a few courts have permitted lessees to
remain in occupancy beyond an otherwise "reasonable" time without
17. 51 Hawaii 473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969).
18. Id. at 476, 462 P.2d at 483.
19. 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
20. Id. at 144, 265 A.2d at 533-34.
21. See McNally v. Moser, 210 Md. 127, 122 A.2d 555 (1955).
22. See Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-In-Action Corp., 340 Ill. 196, 172 N.E. 35 (1930).
23. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 434, 462 P.2d 470, 475 (1969).
24. Id. at 434-35, 462 P.2d at 475.
25. Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
26. Id. at 146, 265 A.2d at 535.
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waiving their right to terminate the lease.2 7 However, this course of
action is inadequate: if the tenant chooses to remain, he continues
occupying uninhabitable premises. In the alternative, "[i] t is of little
comfort to a tenant in these days of housing shortage to accord him the
right, upon constructive eviction, to vacate the premises and terminate
his obligation to pay rent."2
IV. DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT COVENANTS
The present problem is to a great extent attributable to the
treatment of lease covenants as independent. Under traditional
property law, lease covenants may arise in one of two ways: 1) a
covenant must be express; or 2) a covenant must arise by implication.
The latter is restricted to a situation where such a construction is
necessary and indispensable to carry into effect the purpose of the
lease.2 9 Covenants in the law of contracts, however, are more readily
implied, as the courts there attach primary importance to the object
intended by the parties when the agreement was consummated.3"
"Where the acts or covenants of the parties are concurrent, and to be
done or performed at the same time, the covenants are dependent, and
neither party can maintain an action against the other, without averring
and proving performance on his part."'" Conversely, covenants in lease
agreements have been treated as independent 3 2 in that one party can
successfully bring suit without having to prove his own performance.
Thus, if the landlord breached one of his covenants, the tenant was
required to continue paying rent.3 3 Though covenants in certain
instances have been held to be dependent, the result here was merely to
give the tenant a right to discontinue rent payments upon removing
himself from the premises.3" However, an advantage in viewing the
lease covenants as dependent, by adopting the contract theory, is the
availability to the tenant of the basic contract remedies of damages,
reformation and rescission.3 "
27. Barash v. Pennsylvania Terminal Real Estate Corp., 31 A.D.2d 342, 81 N.E.2d 65, 298
N.Y.S.2d 153 (1969).
28. Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 146, 265 A.2d 526, 535 (1970).
29. Id. at 143, 265 A.2d at 533.
30. Id.
31. Higgins v. Whiting, 102 N.J.L. 279, 280, 131 A. 879, 880 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
32. See, e.g., Ng v. Warren, 79 Cal. App. 2d 54, 179 P.2d 41 (1947).
33. See Gombo v. Martise, 44 Misc. 2d 239, 253 N.Y.S.2d 459 (App. T. 1964), wherein the
tenants were precluded from claiming constructive eviction as a defense to landlord's
non-payment proceeding because the tenants had not actually removed from the premises.
The result therefore was to require the tenant to continue paying rent even though his
right to quiet enjoyment was being breached. Note, however, that a new trial was ordered
to determine whether New York's "rent strike" provision could be utilized by the tenant.
34. See Stevenson Stanoyevich Fund v. Steinacher, 125 N.J.L. 326, 15 A.2d 772 (Sup. Ct.
1940); Higgins v. Whiting, 102 N.J.L. 279, 131 A. 879 (Sup. Ct. 1925); McCurdy v.
Wychoff 73 N.J.L. 368, 63 A. 992 (Sup. Ct. 1906); Weiler v. Pancoast, 71 N.J.L. 414, 58 A.
1804 (Sup. Ct. 1904).
35. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 436, 462 P.2d 470, 475 (1969).
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V. CONSUMER PROTECTION IN LEASE AGREEMENTS
Maryland law provides that, unless excluded or modified, in every
sale of an improvement 3 6 to real estate there is an implied warranty
that the improvement is:
(1) Free from faulty materials,
(2) Constructed according to sound engineering standards,
(3) Constructed in a workmanlike manner, and
(4) Fit for habitation,
at the time of delivery of the deed to a completed
improvement ..... .
Certainly, a lease of residential premises for a specified period of time is
as worthy of warranty protection as is an improvement to real estate in
that the lessee, like the purchaser of a home, is attempting to obtain the
utility of a place in which to live for a given period of time. If a
purchased home must be fit for habitation (and the Maryland
legislature has so stated3 8 ) then the rented premises should be afforded
similar protection. There is an inconsistency of logic in according one
party warranty protection and not the other, when both parties are
seeking the same end.
Furthermore, the policy underlying warranty provisions as applied in
the area of the sale of goods3 9 may also be applicable to this problem
by analogy.4 ° Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code grants an
implied warranty, unless excluded or modified, that goods purchased
from a merchant 4 seller "are fit for the ordinary purpose for which
such goods are used." 4 2 Further, if the seller has reason to know of the
particular purpose for which such goods are to be utilized, and that the
buyer is relying on the seller's skill and judgment to select and furnish
36. "Improvement" includes all newly constructed private dwelling units and all fixtures and
structures which are made a part of the newly constructed private dwelling units at the
time of their construction by building contractors. MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 95B (Supp.
1971).
37. Id. § 95B (a).
38. Id. § 95B (a)(4).
39. "'Goods' means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are moveable at
the time of identification to the contract for sale .... MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 2-105
(1964).
40. See Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968); Cintrone v.
Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965); Hertz Commercial
Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing House, 59 Misc. 2d 226, 298 N.Y.S.2d
392 (Civ. Ct. 1969), wherein it was recognized that the Code may be applied by analogy to
the extent that policies underlying a lease of personal property have been similar to those
found in a sale.
41. "'Merchant' means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise ... holds
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practice or goods involved
in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his
employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation
holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill."
MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 2-104(1) (1964).
42. Id. § 2-314(2)(c).
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suitable goods, there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit
for that purpose.4 Additionally, in Maryland, a seller's language, oral
or written, attempting to exclude or modify warranties of merchant-
ability and fitness for a particular purpose is unenforceable when
dealing with consumer goods.4 4 The policy underpinnings of these
sections may well be utilized in formulating a solution to present
inadequacies in residential leases. Arguably, a lease of premises to be
used as a dwelling is a "sale" of a space which will be "consumed" over
the term of the lease. Accordingly, it is submitted that if a merchant
seller4 ' impliedly warrants that his goods are suitable for the ordinary
purpose for which such goods are to be used, then too, a knowledgeable
lessor should warrant that the premises which are the subject of the
lease are fit for habitation where the lessor knows that the premises are
to be utilized as a place of habitation.
VI. SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
This era of rapid population increase has expanded the need and
social desirability for adequate housing. 4 6 "Permitting landlords to rent
'tumbledown' houses is at least a contributing cause to such problems
as urban blight, juvenile delinquency and high taxes to conscientious
landowners." '41 In light of such factors, the doctrine of caveat emptor
can no longer be validly entertained.4 8 Since the lessor has superior
knowledge of the condition of the premises, is made knowledgeable of
building code requirements and violations, and is in a better position,
by virtue of his expertise, to know of latent defects (structural or
otherwise),4 9 it should be his duty to assume the responsibility for
discovering and remedying conditions which have rendered or threaten
to render the premises uninhabitable. As stated in the dissenting
opinion in Bowles v. Mahoney,"' "It is fair to presume that no
individual would voluntarily choose to live in a dwelling that had
become unsafe for human habitation."'s
In Brown v. Southall Realty Co.,"2 the court held that a lease
executed by the owner of dwelling property was void" 3 if the owner, at
the time of executing the lease, knew of existing housing code
43. Id. § 2-315.
44. MD. ANN. CODE art. 95 B, § 2-316A (Supp. 1972).
45. See note 41 supra.
46. Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 596, 111 N.W.2d 409, 413 (1961).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 452, 251 A.2d 268, 272 (1969).
50. 202 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
51. Id. at 326.
52. 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968).
53. Note that, although the lease is void ab initio, the tenant nevertheless becomes a tenant
at sufferance and therefore the landlord is entitled to rent in an amount equal to the reason-
able value of the premises based on its condition at the time of occupancy. William J.
Davis, Inc. v. Sladem, 271 A.2d 412 (D.C. App. 1970).
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violations which would render the property unsafe or unsanitary.
Nevertheless, the court in Saunders v. First National Realty Corp.I4
refused to hold that violations occurring after the tenancy commenced
voided the lease.' In the latter case, the tenant raised the fact that
there were numerous housing code violations which rendered the
premises uninhabitable as a defense to the landlord's action for
possession. The court concluded that although the landlord permitted
violations of housing regulations to exist, he would not be precluded
from bringing an action for possession based on nonpayment of rent." 6
Javins v. First National Realty Corp.' 7 reversed the Saunders holding
and ruled that a warranty of habitability, measured by the conditions
set out in the Housing Regulations for the District of Columbia, is
implied by operation of law into leases of urban dwelling units covered
by those regulations, and that breach of this warranty gives rise to usual
remedies for breach of contract." 8 The court went on to say "that the
old common law rule imposing an obligation upon the lessee to repair
during the lease term was really never intended to apply to residential
urban leaseholds." s 9
VII. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that nonrecognition of an implied covenant of
habitability has resulted in an inadequacy in present Maryland law. A
party leasing a residential dwelling acts on the premise that such
dwelling wil) be fit for habitation. Concluding that such need has been
met by a prospective lessee's opportunity to inspect is pure legal fiction
in that often the defects are not recognized upon "normal inspec-
tion."6" Furthermore, the remedy of constructive eviction is totally in-
adequate in that it negates the very purpose of the original lease, i.e.
providing the tenant with a dwelling fit for habitation. Additionally,
the tenant carries with him the burden of establishing facts sufficient to
constitute constructive eviction. Actions for damages6 are inadequate
in that the lessee continues to occupy uninhabitable premises. This does
little to alleviate existent dangers to life, health and safety.
It is submitted that: 1) there is sufficient authority to justify the
Maryland Court of Appeals in implying a warranty in these cases; and
2) the Maryland Legislature should forthwith adopt an implied
54. 245 A.2d 836 (D.C. App. 1968).
55. Id. at 838.
56. Id. at 839.
57. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
58. Id. at 1072-73.
59. Id. at 1080.
60. The normal inspection "in fact" is in reality less thorough than a normal inspection "at
law." More often than not, a tenant, in making a normal inspection "in fact," does not
discover what the legal test says he should discover.
61. After July 1, 1973 residents of Baltimore City will have an action at law for the violation of
building and electrical codes. MD. ANN. CODE art. 53, § 44 (1972).
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covenant of habitability to be included in all residential leases of a year
or less. The covenant should apply to both furnished and unfurnished
dwellings and should warrant that the premises will be habitable at the
commencement of the tenancy, and will remain habitable for the
duration of the tenancy. The landlord should not be required, however,
to expend funds to repair premises rendered uninhabitable by the
tenant during his tenancy. After adopting the implied covenant of
habitability, the lease should be viewed as a contract, and the remedies
of damages, reformation and rescission should be available. The
protection of the implied covenant of habitability could be made
available to lessees simply by an act providing that local housing
regulations be incorporated into residential leases. This, at least, would
alleviate some present inadequacies while we await more extensive
revision of landlord tenant law.
Samuel B. Dolcimascolo
